Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/031

Secure Remote Attestation

Markus Jakobsson

Abstract: More than ten years ago, a devastating data substitution attack was shown to successfully compromise all previously proposed remote attestation techniques. In fact, the authors went further than simply attacking previously proposed methods: they called into question whether it is theoretically possible for remote attestation methods to exist in face of their attack. Subsequently, it has been shown that it is possible, by relying on self-modifying code. We show that it is possible to create remote attestation that is secure against all data substitution attacks, without relying on self-modifying code. Our proposed method relies on a construction of the checksum process that forces frequent L2 cache overflows if any data substitution attack takes place.

Category / Keywords: applications /

Date: received 7 Jan 2018

Contact author: markus jakobsson at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180108:111848 (All versions of this report)

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