Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/028

Compact Energy and Delay-Aware Authentication

Muslum Ozgur Ozmen and Rouzbeh Behnia and Attila A. Yavuz

Abstract: Authentication and integrity are fundamental security services that are critical for any viable system. However, some of the emerging systems (e.g., smart grids, aerial drones) are delay-sensitive, and therefore their safe and reliable operation requires delay-aware authentication mechanisms. Unfortunately, the current state-of-the-art authentication mechanisms either incur heavy computations or lack scalability for such large and distributed systems. Hence, there is a crucial need for digital signature schemes that can satisfy the requirements of delay-aware applications.

In this paper, we propose a new digital signature scheme that we refer to as Compact Energy and Delay-aware Authentication (CEDA). In CEDA, signature generation and verification only require a small-constant number of multiplications and Pseudo Random Function (PRF) calls. Therefore, it achieves the lowest end-to-end delay among its counterparts. Our implementation results on an ARM processor and commodity hardware show that CEDA has the most efficient signature generation on both platforms, while offering a fast signature verification. Among its delay-aware counterparts, CEDA has a smaller private key with a constant-size signature. All these advantages are achieved with the cost of a larger public key. This is a highly favorable trade-off for applications wherein the verifier is not memory-limited. We open-sourced our implementation of CEDA to enable its broad testing and adaptation.

Category / Keywords: Applied cryptography, delay-aware authentication, real-time networks, digital signatures

Original Publication (in the same form): 2018 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)
DOI:
10.1109/CNS.2018.8433134

Date: received 6 Jan 2018, last revised 25 Aug 2018

Contact author: ozmenmu at oregonstate edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180825:220452 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/028


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