**Evaluation of Resilience of randomized RNS implementation **

*Jérôme Courtois and Lokman Abbas-Turki and Jean-Claude Bajard*

**Abstract: **Randomized moduli in Residue Number System (RNS) generate effectively large noise and
make quite difficult to attack a secret key $K$ from only few observations of Hamming distances
$H=(H_0, ..., H_{d-1})$ that result from the changes on the state variable. Since Hamming distances have gaussian distribution and most of the statistic tests, like NIST's ones, evaluate discrete and uniform distribution, we choose to use side-channel attacks as a tool in order to evaluate randomisation of Hamming distances . This paper analyses the resilience against Correlation Power Analysis (CPA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA) when the cryptographic system is protected against Simple Power Analysis (SPA) by a Montgomery Powering Ladder (MPL). While both analysis use only information on the current state, DPA Square crosses the information of all the states. We emphasize that DPA Square performs better than DPA and CPA and we show that the number of observations $S$ needed to perform an attack increases with respect to the number of moduli $n$. For Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC) and using a Monte Carlo simulation, we conjecture that $S = O((2n)!/(n!)^2)$.

**Category / Keywords: **implementation / RNS, moduli randomization, Monte Carlo, ECC, side channel attack, DPA, CPA, DPA Square

**Date: **received 2 Jan 2018

**Contact author: **jerome courtois at lip6 fr

**Available format(s): **PDF | BibTeX Citation

**Version: **20180102:175445 (All versions of this report)

**Short URL: **ia.cr/2018/009

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