Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/993

A Framework for Efficient Adaptively Secure Composable Oblivious Transfer in the ROM

Paulo S. L. M. Barreto and Bernardo David and Rafael Dowsley and Kirill Morozov and Anderson C. A. Nascimento

Abstract: Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a fundamental cryptographic protocol that finds a number of applications, in particular, as an essential building block for two-party and multi-party computation. We construct a round-optimal (2 rounds) universally composable (UC) protocol for oblivious transfer secure against active adaptive adversaries from any OW-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme with certain properties in the random oracle model (ROM). In terms of computation, our protocol only requires the generation of a public/secret-key pair, two encryption operations and one decryption operation, apart from a few calls to the random oracle. In~terms of communication, our protocol only requires the transfer of one public-key, two ciphertexts, and three binary strings of roughly the same size as the message. Next, we show how to instantiate our construction under the low noise LPN, McEliece, QC-MDPC, LWE, and CDH assumptions. Our instantiations based on the low noise LPN, McEliece, and QC-MDPC assumptions are the first UC-secure OT protocols based on coding assumptions to achieve: 1) adaptive security, 2) optimal round complexity, 3) low communication and computational complexities. Previous results in this setting only achieved static security and used costly cut-and-choose techniques. Our instantiation based on CDH achieves adaptive security at the small cost of communicating only two more group elements as compared to the gap-DH based Simplest OT protocol of Chou and Orlandi (Latincrypt 15), which only achieves static security in the ROM.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols /

Date: received 9 Oct 2017, last revised 23 Oct 2017

Contact author: rafael at cs au dk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20171023:083453 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/993

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