### The MMap Strikes Back: Obfuscation and New Multilinear Maps Immune to CLT13 Zeroizing Attacks

Fermi Ma and Mark Zhandry

##### Abstract

All known multilinear map candidates have suffered from a class of attacks known as zeroizing'' attacks, which render them unusable for many applications. We provide a new construction of polynomial-degree multilinear maps and show that our scheme is provably immune to zeroizing attacks under a strengthening of the Branching Program Un-Annihilatability Assumption (Garg et al., TCC 2016-B). Concretely, we build our scheme on top of the CLT13 multilinear maps (Coron et al., CRYPTO 2013). In order to justify the security of our new scheme, we devise a weak multilinear map model for CLT13 that captures zeroizing attacks and generalizations, reflecting all known classical polynomial-time attacks on CLT13. In our model, we show that our new multilinear map scheme achieves ideal security, meaning no known attacks apply to our scheme. Using our scheme, we give a new multiparty key agreement protocol that is several orders of magnitude more efficient that what was previously possible. We also demonstrate the general applicability of our model by showing that several existing obfuscation and order-revealing encryption schemes, when instantiated with the CLT13 maps, are secure against known attacks. These are schemes that are actually being implemented for experimentation, but until our work had no rigorous justification for security.

Note: improvements in exposition, added comparison to BGMZ18 weak model for GGH15.

Available format(s)
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in TCC 2018
Keywords
multilinear mapsobfuscationCLT13multiparty key exchange
Contact author(s)
fermima1 @ gmail com
History
2018-10-28: last of 3 revisions
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/946

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/946,
author = {Fermi Ma and Mark Zhandry},
title = {The MMap Strikes Back: Obfuscation and New Multilinear Maps Immune to CLT13 Zeroizing Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/946},
year = {2017},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/946}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/946}
}

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