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Paper 2017/937

Random Oracles and Non-Uniformity

Sandro Coretti
Yevgeniy Dodis
Siyao Guo
John Steinberger
Abstract

We revisit security proofs for various cryptographic primitives in the auxiliary-input random-oracle model (AI-ROM), in which an attacker $A$ can compute arbitrary $S$ bits of leakage about the random oracle $\mathcal O$ before attacking the system and then use additional $T$ oracle queries to $\mathcal O$ during the attack. This model has natural applications in settings where traditional random-oracle proofs are not useful: (a) security against non-uniform attackers; (b) security against preprocessing. We obtain a number of new results about the AI-ROM: Unruh (CRYPTO '07) introduced the pre-sampling technique, which generically reduces security proofs in the AI-ROM to a much simpler $P$-bit-fixing random-oracle model (BF-ROM), where the attacker can arbitrarily fix the values of $\mathcal O$ on some $P$ coordinates, but then the remaining coordinates are chosen at random. Unruh's security loss for this transformation is $\sqrt{ST/P}$. We improve this loss to the optimal value $O(ST/P)$, which implies nearly tight bounds for a variety of indistinguishability applications in the AI-ROM. While the basic pre-sampling technique cannot give tight bounds for unpredictability applications, we introduce a novel "multiplicative version" of pre-sampling, which allows to dramatically reduce the size of $P$ of the pre-sampled set to $P=O(ST)$ and yields nearly tight security bounds for a variety of unpredictability applications in the AI-ROM. Qualitatively, it validates Unruh's "polynomial pre-sampling conjecture"---disproved in general by Dodis et al. (EUROCRYPT '17)---for the special case of unpredictability applications. Using our techniques, we reprove nearly all AI-ROM bounds obtained by Dodis et al. (using a much more laborious compression technique), but we also apply it to many settings where the compression technique is either inapplicable (e.g., computational reductions) or appears intractable (e.g., Merkle-Damgard hashing). We show that for any salted Merkle-Damgard hash function with m-bit output there exists a collision-finding circuit of size $\Theta(2^{m/3})$ (taking salt as the input), which is significantly below the $2^{m/2}$ birthday security conjectured against uniform attackers. We build two general compilers showing how to generically extend the security of applications proven in the traditional ROM to the AI-ROM. One compiler simply prepends a public salt to the random oracle and shows that salting generically provably defeats preprocessing. Overall, our results make it much easier to get concrete security bounds in the AI-ROM. These bounds in turn give concrete conjectures about the security of these applications (in the standard model) against non-uniform attackers.

Note: Fixed a bug in earlier versions of the proofs for the multiplicative presampling part of Lemma 1 (special thanks to Patrick Harasser for pointing out that bug)

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2018
Keywords
Random-Oracle Model Non-Uniformity Space-Time Tradeoffs Collision-Resistance
Contact author(s)
corettis @ gmail com
dodis @ cs nyu edu
sg191 @ nyu edu
jpsteinb @ gmail com
History
2022-08-09: last of 2 revisions
2017-09-27: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/937
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/937,
      author = {Sandro Coretti and Yevgeniy Dodis and Siyao Guo and John Steinberger},
      title = {Random Oracles and Non-Uniformity},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/937},
      year = {2017},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/937}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/937}
}
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