### How to Construct a Leakage-Resilient (Stateless) Trusted Party

Daniel Genkin, Yual Ishai, and Mor Weiss

##### Abstract

Trusted parties and devices are commonly used in the real world to securely perform computations on secret inputs. However, their security can often be compromised by side-channel attacks in which the adversary obtains partial leakage on intermediate computation values. This gives rise to the following natural question: To what extent can one protect the trusted party against leakage? Our goal is to design a hardware device $T$ that allows $m\ge 1$ parties to securely evaluate a function $f(x_1,\ldots,x_m)$ of their inputs by feeding $T$ with encoded inputs that are obtained using local secret randomness. Security should hold even in the presence of an active adversary that can corrupt a subset of parties and obtain restricted leakage on the internal computations in $T$. We design hardware devices $T$ in this setting both for zero-knowledge proofs and for general multi-party computations. Our constructions can unconditionally resist either $AC^0$ leakage or a strong form of only computation leaks'' (OCL) leakage that captures realistic side-channel attacks, providing different tradeoffs between efficiency and security.

Available format(s)
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in TCC 2017
Keywords
Leakage-ResilienceSecure Multiparty ComputationAlgebraic Manipulation DetectionAMD Circuits
Contact author(s)
mormorweiss @ gmail com
History
2017-12-04: last of 3 revisions
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/926

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/926,
author = {Daniel Genkin and Yual Ishai and Mor Weiss},
title = {How to Construct a Leakage-Resilient (Stateless) Trusted Party},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/926},
year = {2017},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/926}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/926}
}

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