Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/910

Thwarting Fault Attacks using the Internal Redundancy Countermeasure (IRC)

Benjamin Lac and Anne Canteaut and Jacques J.A. Fournier and Renaud Sirdey

Abstract: A growing number of connected objects, with their high performance and low-resources constraints, are embedding lightweight ciphers for protecting the confidentiality of the data they manipulate or store. Since those objects are easily accessible, they are prone to a whole range of physical attacks, one of which are fault attacks against for which countermeasures are usually expensive to implement, especially on off-the-shelf devices. For such devices, we propose a new generic software countermeasure, called the Internal Redundancy Countermeasure (IRC), to thwart most fault attacks while preserving the performances of the targeted cipher. We report practical experiments showing that IRC successfully thwarts fault attacks on the block cipher PRIDE and on the stream cipher TRIVIUM for which we protect both the initialization and the keystream generation.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / IRC; Physical attacks; Fault attacks; SIMD instructions; Software countermeasure; Lightweight cryptography; IoT.

Date: received 19 Sep 2017

Contact author: benjamin lac at cea fr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20170924:213739 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/910

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