Paper 2017/910

Thwarting Fault Attacks using the Internal Redundancy Countermeasure (IRC)

Benjamin Lac, Anne Canteaut, Jacques J. A. Fournier, and Renaud Sirdey


A growing number of connected objects, with their high performance and low-resources constraints, are embedding lightweight ciphers for protecting the confidentiality of the data they manipulate or store. Since those objects are easily accessible, they are prone to a whole range of physical attacks, one of which are fault attacks against for which countermeasures are usually expensive to implement, especially on off-the-shelf devices. For such devices, we propose a new generic software countermeasure, called the Internal Redundancy Countermeasure (IRC), to thwart most fault attacks while preserving the performances of the targeted cipher. We report practical experiments showing that IRC successfully thwarts fault attacks on the block cipher PRIDE and on the stream cipher TRIVIUM for which we protect both the initialization and the keystream generation.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
IRCPhysical attacksFault attacksSIMD instructionsSoftware countermeasureLightweight cryptographyIoT.
Contact author(s)
benjamin lac @ cea fr
2017-09-24: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Benjamin Lac and Anne Canteaut and Jacques J. A.  Fournier and Renaud Sirdey},
      title = {Thwarting Fault Attacks using the Internal Redundancy Countermeasure (IRC)},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/910},
      year = {2017},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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