Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/900

Proof of a shuffle for lattice-based cryptography (Full version)

Núria Costa and Ramiro Martínez and Paz Morillo

Abstract: In this paper we present the first proof of a shuffle for lattice-based cryptography which can be used to build a universally verifiable mix-net capable of mixing votes encrypted with a post-quantum algorithm, thus achieving long-term privacy. Universal verifiability is achieved by means of the publication of a non-interactive zero knowledge proof of a shuffle generated by each mix-node which can be verified by any observer. This published data guarantees long-term privacy since its security is based on perfectly hiding commitments and also on the hardness of solving the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) problem, that is widely believed to be quantum resistant.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / mix-nets, evoting, post-quantum cryptographic protocol, RLWE encryption, proof of a shuffle

Original Publication (with major differences): Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems (Nordic 2017)

Date: received 15 Sep 2017, last revised 21 Oct 2020

Contact author: nuria costa at scytl com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: (updated to include DOI)

Version: 20201021:123431 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]