Paper 2017/900
Proof of a shuffle for lattice-based cryptography (Full version)
Núria Costa, Ramiro Martínez, and Paz Morillo
Abstract
In this paper we present the first proof of a shuffle for lattice-based cryptography which can be used to build a universally verifiable mix-net capable of mixing votes encrypted with a post-quantum algorithm, thus achieving long-term privacy. Universal verifiability is achieved by means of the publication of a non-interactive zero knowledge proof of a shuffle generated by each mix-node which can be verified by any observer. This published data guarantees long-term privacy since its security is based on perfectly hiding commitments and also on the hardness of solving the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) problem, that is widely believed to be quantum resistant.
Note: (updated to include DOI)
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems (Nordic 2017)
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-319-70290-2_17
- Keywords
- mix-netsevotingpost-quantum cryptographic protocolRLWE encryptionproof of a shuffle
- Contact author(s)
- nuria costa @ scytl com
- History
- 2020-10-21: last of 3 revisions
- 2017-09-24: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/900
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/900,
author = {Núria Costa and Ramiro Martínez and Paz Morillo},
title = {Proof of a shuffle for lattice-based cryptography (Full version)},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/900},
year = {2017},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-70290-2_17},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/900}
}
