Paper 2017/900

Proof of a shuffle for lattice-based cryptography (Full version)

Núria Costa, Ramiro Martínez, and Paz Morillo

Abstract

In this paper we present the first proof of a shuffle for lattice-based cryptography which can be used to build a universally verifiable mix-net capable of mixing votes encrypted with a post-quantum algorithm, thus achieving long-term privacy. Universal verifiability is achieved by means of the publication of a non-interactive zero knowledge proof of a shuffle generated by each mix-node which can be verified by any observer. This published data guarantees long-term privacy since its security is based on perfectly hiding commitments and also on the hardness of solving the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) problem, that is widely believed to be quantum resistant.

Note: (updated to include DOI)

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems (Nordic 2017)
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-70290-2_17
Keywords
mix-netsevotingpost-quantum cryptographic protocolRLWE encryptionproof of a shuffle
Contact author(s)
nuria costa @ scytl com
History
2020-10-21: last of 3 revisions
2017-09-24: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/900
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/900,
      author = {Núria Costa and Ramiro Martínez and Paz Morillo},
      title = {Proof of a shuffle for lattice-based cryptography (Full version)},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/900},
      year = {2017},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-70290-2_17},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/900}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/900}
}
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