Paper 2017/799
Practical Multi-party Private Set Intersection from Symmetric-Key Techniques
Vladimir Kolesnikov, Naor Matania, Benny Pinkas, Mike Rosulek, and Ni Trieu
Abstract
We present a new paradigm for multi-party private set intersection (PSI) that allows $n$ parties to compute the intersection of their datasets without revealing any additional information. We explore a variety of instantiations of this paradigm. Our protocols avoid computationally expensive public-key operations and are secure in the presence of any number of semi-honest participants (i.e., without an honest majority). We demonstrate the practicality of our protocols with an implementation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first implementation of a multi-party PSI protocol. For 5 parties with data-sets of $2^{20}$ items each, our protocol requires only $72$ seconds. In an optimization achieving a slightly weaker variant of security (augmented semi-honest model), the same task requires only $22$ seconds. The technical core of our protocol is oblivious evaluation of a {\em programmable} pseudorandom function (\OPPRF), which we instantiate in three different ways. We believe our new \OPPRF abstraction and constructions may be of independent interest.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) 2017
- Keywords
- Private Set IntersectionOblivious PRFSecure Multiparty ComputationCuckoo Hashing
- Contact author(s)
- trieun @ oregonstate edu
- History
- 2017-08-25: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/799
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/799, author = {Vladimir Kolesnikov and Naor Matania and Benny Pinkas and Mike Rosulek and Ni Trieu}, title = {Practical Multi-party Private Set Intersection from Symmetric-Key Techniques}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/799}, year = {2017}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/799} }