Paper 2017/788
Attack on AES Implementation Exploiting Publicly-visible Partial Result
William Diehl
Abstract
Although AES is designed to be secure against a wide variety of linear and differential attacks, security ultimately depends on a combination of the engineering implementation and proper application by intended users. In this work, we attack a publicly-available VHDL implementation of AES by exploiting a partial result visible at the top-level public interface of the implementation. The vulnerability renders the security of the implementation equivalent to a one-round version of AES. An algorithm is presented that exploits this vulnerability to recover the secret key in 2^31 operations. The algorithm is coded in an interpreted high-level language and successfully recovers secret keys, with one set of known plaintext, using a general-purpose CPU in an average of 30 minutes.
Note: Rev 1 - No change to .pdf file. Changed "231 operations" to "2^31 operations" in submission abstract.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Encryptionciphercryptographycryptanalysisfield programmable gate arrayAES
- Contact author(s)
- wdiehl @ gmu edu
- History
- 2017-08-21: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/788
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/788,
author = {William Diehl},
title = {Attack on {AES} Implementation Exploiting Publicly-visible Partial Result},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/788},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/788}
}
