Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/737

SecReach: Secure Reachability Computation on Encrypted Location Check-in Data

Hanyu Quan and Boyang Wang and Iraklis Leontiadis and Ming Li and Yuqing Zhang

Abstract: Reachability, which answers whether one person is reachable from another through a sequence of contacts within a period of time, is of great importance in many domains such as social behavior analysis. Recently, with the prevalence of various location-based services (LBSs), a great amount of spatiotemporal location check-in data is generated by individual GPS-equipped mobile devices and collected by LBS companies, which stimulates research on reachability queries in these location check-in datasets. Meanwhile, a growing trend is for LBS companies to use scalable and cost-effective clouds to collect, store, and analyze data, which makes it necessary to encrypt location check-in data before outsourcing due to privacy concerns. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a scheme, SecReach, to securely evaluate reachability queries on encrypted location check-in data by using somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE). We prove that our scheme is secure against a semihonest cloud server. We also present a proof-of-concept implementation using the state-of-the-art SWHE library (i.e., HElib), which shows the efficiency and feasibility of our scheme.

Category / Keywords: reachability, location privacy, homomorphic encryption

Original Publication (in the same form): CANS 2016
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-48965-0_25

Date: received 31 Jul 2017

Contact author: leontiad at njit edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20170801:152223 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/737

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