Paper 2017/737

SecReach: Secure Reachability Computation on Encrypted Location Check-in Data

Hanyu Quan, Boyang Wang, Iraklis Leontiadis, Ming Li, and Yuqing Zhang

Abstract

Reachability, which answers whether one person is reachable from another through a sequence of contacts within a period of time, is of great importance in many domains such as social behavior analysis. Recently, with the prevalence of various location-based services (LBSs), a great amount of spatiotemporal location check-in data is generated by individual GPS-equipped mobile devices and collected by LBS companies, which stimulates research on reachability queries in these location check-in datasets. Meanwhile, a growing trend is for LBS companies to use scalable and cost-effective clouds to collect, store, and analyze data, which makes it necessary to encrypt location check-in data before outsourcing due to privacy concerns. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a scheme, SecReach, to securely evaluate reachability queries on encrypted location check-in data by using somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE). We prove that our scheme is secure against a semihonest cloud server. We also present a proof-of-concept implementation using the state-of-the-art SWHE library (i.e., HElib), which shows the efficiency and feasibility of our scheme.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. CANS 2016
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-48965-0_25
Keywords
reachabilitylocation privacyhomomorphic encryption
Contact author(s)
leontiad @ njit edu
History
2017-08-01: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/737
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/737,
      author = {Hanyu Quan and Boyang Wang and Iraklis Leontiadis and Ming Li and Yuqing Zhang},
      title = {{SecReach}: Secure Reachability Computation on Encrypted Location Check-in Data},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/737},
      year = {2017},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-48965-0_25},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/737}
}
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