**Distributed Computing with Channel Noise**

*Abhinav Aggarwal and Varsha Dani and Thomas P. Hayes and Jared Saia*

**Abstract: **A group of $n$ users want to run a distributed protocol $\pi$ over a network where communication occurs via private point-to-point channels. Unfortunately, an adversary, who knows $\pi$, is able to maliciously flip bits on the channels. Can we efficiently simulate $\pi$ in the presence of such an adversary?

We show that this is possible, even when $L$, the number of bits sent in $\pi$, and $T$, the number of bits flipped by the adversary are not known in advance. In particular, we show how to create a robust version of $\pi$ that 1) fails with probability at most $\delta$, for any $\delta > 0$; and 2) sends $\tilde{O}(L+T)$ bits, where the $\tilde{O}$ notation hides a $\log(nL/\delta)$ term multiplying $L$.

Additionally, we show how to improve this result when the average message size $\alpha$ is not constant. In particular, we give an algorithm that sends $O(L(1 + (1/\alpha) \log(nL/\delta) + T )$ bits. This algorithm is adaptive in that it does not require a priori knowledge of $\alpha$. We note that if $\alpha$ is $\Omega (log(nL/\delta))$, then this improved algorithm sends only $O(L + T)$ bits, and is therefore within a constant factor of optimal.

**Category / Keywords: **foundations / interactive communication, information theoretic security

**Date: **received 18 Jul 2017

**Contact author: **abhiag at unm edu

**Available format(s): **PDF | BibTeX Citation

**Version: **20170725:171227 (All versions of this report)

**Short URL: **ia.cr/2017/710

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