Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/706

SCATTER : A New Dimension in Side-Channel

Hugues Thiebeauld and Georges Gagnerot and Antoine Wurcker and Christophe Clavier

Abstract: Side-channel techniques have well progressed over the last few years, leading to the creation of a variety of statistical tools for extracting the secrets used in cryptographic algorithms. Such techniques are taking advantage of the side-channel traces collected during the executions of secret computations in the product. Noticeably, the vast majority of side-channel attacks requires the traces have been aligned together beforehand. This prerequisite turns out to be more and more challenging in the practical realisation of attacks as many devices include hardware or software countermeasures to increase this difficulty. This is typically achieved applying random jittering or random executions with fake operations. In this paper, we introduce \textsl{scatter}, a new attack which has the potential to tackle most of the alignment issues. scatter brings a new dimension to improve the efficiency of existing attacks and opens the door to a large set of potential new attack techniques. The effectiveness of scatter has been proven on both simulated traces and real word secure products. As a result, scatter is a new side-channel technique particularly powerful when the trace alignment represents an issue, or even when considering low-cost attacks, as the requirements in terms of equipment and expertise are significantly reduced.

Category / Keywords: implementation / side-channel, scatter, mutual information, Pearson chi-squared

Date: received 17 Jul 2017

Contact author: hugues thiebeauld at eshard com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20170725:170954 (All versions of this report)

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