Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/693

Cryptanalysis of Deoxys and its Internal Tweakable Block Ciphers

Carlos Cid and Tao Huang and Thomas Peyrin and Yu Sasaki and Ling Song

Abstract: In this article, we provide the first independent security analysis of Deoxys, a third-round authenticated encryption candidate of the CAESAR competition, and its internal tweakable block ciphers Deoxys-BC-256 and Deoxys-BC-384. We show that the related-tweakey differential bounds provided by the designers can be greatly improved thanks to a MILP-based search tool. In particular, we develop a new method to incorporate linear incompatibility in the MILP model. We use this tool to generate valid differential paths for reduced-round versions of Deoxys-BC-256 and Deoxys-BC-384, later combining them into broader boomerang or rectangle attacks. Here, we also develop a new MILP model which optimises the two paths by taking into account the effect of the ladder switch technique. Interestingly, with the tweak in Deoxys-BC providing extra input as opposed to a classical block cipher, we can even consider beyond full-codebook attacks, and we analyse how our results can be improved in this setting. As these primitives are based on the TWEAKEY framework, we further study how the security of the cipher is impacted when playing with the tweak/key sizes. All in all, we are able to attack 10 rounds of Deoxys-BC-256 (out of 14) and 14 rounds of Deoxys-BC-384 (out of 16). The extra rounds specified in Deoxys-BC to balance the tweak input (when compared to AES) seem to provide about the same security margin as AES-128. Finally we analyse why the authenticated encryption modes of Deoxys mostly prevent our attacks on Deoxys-BC to apply to the authenticated encryption primitive.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Deoxys, AES, authenticated encryption, block cipher, differential cryptanalysis, boomerang attack, MILP, linear incompatibility, ladder switch

Original Publication (in the same form): IACR-FSE-2018

Date: received 12 Jul 2017, last revised 4 Sep 2017

Contact author: thomas peyrin at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20170904:065839 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/693

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