Paper 2017/660

Profiling Good Leakage Models For Masked Implementations

Changhai Ou, Zhu Wang, Degang Sun, and Xinping Zhou


Leakage model plays a very important role in side channel attacks. An accurate leakage model greatly improves the efficiency of attacks. However, how to profile a "good enough" leakage model, or how to measure the accuracy of a leakage model, is seldom studied. Durvaux et al. proposed leakage certification tests to profile "good enough" leakage model for unmasked implementations. However, they left the leakage model profiling for protected implementations as an open problem. To solve this problem, we propose the first practical higher-order leakage model certification tests for masked implementations. First and second order attacks are performed on the simulations of serial and parallel implementations of a first-order fixed masking. A third-order attack is performed on another simulation of a second-order random masked implementation. The experimental results show that our new tests can profile the leakage models accurately.

Note: we change a mistake in the paper

Available format(s)
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
leakage certificationHODPAmaskingleakage modelside channel attack
Contact author(s)
ouchanghai @ iie ac cn
2017-07-06: revised
2017-07-05: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Changhai Ou and Zhu Wang and Degang Sun and Xinping Zhou},
      title = {Profiling Good Leakage Models For Masked Implementations},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/660},
      year = {2017},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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