CRYSTALS -- Dilithium: Digital Signatures from Module Lattices

Leo Ducas; Tancrede Lepoint; Vadim Lyubashevsky; Peter Schwabe; Gregor Seiler; Damien Stehle

Paper 2017/633

CRYSTALS -- Dilithium: Digital Signatures from Module Lattices

Leo Ducas, Tancrede Lepoint, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Peter Schwabe, Gregor Seiler, and Damien Stehle

Abstract

This paper presents Dilithium, a lattice-based signature scheme that is part of the CRYSTALS (Cryptographic Suite for Algebraic Lattices) package that will be submitted to the NIST call for post-quantum standards. The scheme is designed to be simple to securely implement against side-channel attacks and to have comparable efficiency to the currently best lattice-based signature schemes. Our implementation results show that Dilithium is competitive with lattice schemes of the same security level and outperforms digital signature schemes based on other post-quantum assumptions.

Note: Changes: - Improved cycle counts (over the CHES 2018 publication) of the scheme - Removed the Gaussian version of the Dilithium scheme - The presented scheme now closely matches the submission to the NIST standardization process

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: A minor revision of an IACR publication in TCHES 2018
Keywords: digital signatures post-quantum cryptography implementations
Contact author(s): vadim lyubash @ gmail com
History: 2018-09-10: revised; 2017-06-27: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2017/633
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/633,
      author = {Leo Ducas and Tancrede Lepoint and Vadim Lyubashevsky and Peter Schwabe and Gregor Seiler and Damien Stehle},
      title = {{CRYSTALS} -- Dilithium: Digital Signatures from Module Lattices},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/633},
      year = {2017},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/633}
}