Paper 2017/623

Back to Massey: Impressively fast, scalable and tight security evaluation tools

Marios O. Choudary and P. G. Popescu

Abstract

None of the existing rank estimation algorithms can scale to large cryptographic keys, such as 4096-bit (512 bytes) RSA keys. In this paper, we present the first solution to estimate the guessing entropy of arbitrarily large keys, based on mathematical bounds, resulting in the fastest and most scalable security evaluation tool to date. Our bounds can be computed within a fraction of a second, with no memory overhead, and provide a margin of only a few bits for a full 128-bit AES key.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published by the IACR in CHES 2017
Keywords
side-channel attacksguessing entropyboundsscalability
Contact author(s)
marios choudary @ cs pub ro
pgpopescu @ yahoo com
History
2017-09-26: last of 2 revisions
2017-06-27: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/623
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/623,
      author = {Marios O.  Choudary and P. G.  Popescu},
      title = {Back to Massey: Impressively fast, scalable and tight security evaluation tools},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/623},
      year = {2017},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/623}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/623}
}
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