Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/570

Can You Trust Your Encrypted Cloud? An Assessment of SpiderOakONE’s Security

Anders P. K. Dalskov and Claudio Orlandi

Abstract: This paper presents an independent security review of a popular encrypted cloud storage service (ECS) SpiderOakONE. Contrary to previous work analyzing similar programs, we formally define a minimal security requirements for confidentiality in ECS which takes into account the possibility that the ECS actively turns against its users in an attempt to break the confidentiality of the users' data.

Our analysis uncovered several serious issues, which either directly or indirectly damage the confidentiality of a user's files, therefore breaking the claimed Zero- or No-Knowledge property (e.g., the claim that even the ECS itself cannot access the users' data). After responsibly disclosing the issues we found to SpiderOak, most have been fixed.

Category / Keywords: applications / Cloud storage, end-to-end encryption, SpiderOak

Date: received 12 Jun 2017, last revised 10 Jan 2018

Contact author: anderspkd at cs au dk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180111:002612 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/570


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