Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/549

ZeroTrace : Oblivious Memory Primitives from Intel SGX

Sajin Sasy and Sergey Gorbunov and Christopher W. Fletcher

Abstract: We are witnessing a confluence between applied cryptography and secure hardware systems in enabling secure cloud computing. On one hand, work in applied cryptography has enabled efficient, oblivious data-structures and memory primitives. On the other, secure hardware and the emergence of Intel SGX has enabled a low-overhead and mass market mechanism for isolated execution. By themselves these technologies have their disadvantages. Oblivious memory primitives carry high performance overheads, especially when run non-interactively. Intel SGX, while more efficient, suffers from numerous software-based side-channel attacks, high context switching costs, and bounded memory size.

In this work we build a new library of oblivious memory primitives, which we call ZeroTrace. ZeroTrace is designed to carefully combine state-of-the-art oblivious RAM techniques and SGX, while mitigating individual disadvantages of these technologies. To the best of our knowledge, ZeroTrace represents the first oblivious memory primitives running on a real secure hardware platform. ZeroTrace simultaneously enables a dramatic speed-up over pure cryptography and protection from software-based side-channel attacks. The core of our design is an efficient and flexible block-level memory controller that provides oblivious execution against any active software adversary, and across asynchronous SGX enclave terminations. Performance-wise, the memory controller can service requests for 4~B blocks in 1.2~ms and 1~KB blocks in 3.4~ms (given a 10~GB dataset). On top of our memory controller, we evaluate Set/Dictionary/List interfaces which can all perform basic operations (e.g., get/put/insert).

Category / Keywords: implementation, cloud security, oblivious memory access

Original Publication (with minor differences): NDSS 2018

Date: received 6 Jun 2017, last revised 5 Dec 2017

Contact author: sajin sasy at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Abstract fix

Version: 20171205:171952 (All versions of this report)

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