Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/545

Resource-efficient OT combiners with active security

Ignacio Cascudo and Ivan Damgård and Oriol Farràs and Samuel Ranellucci

Abstract: An OT-combiner takes $n$ candidate implementations of the oblivious transfer (OT) functionality, some of which may be faulty, and produces a secure instance of oblivious transfer as long as a large enough number of the candidates are secure. We see an OT-combiner as a 2-party protocol that can make several black-box calls to each of the $n$ OT candidates, and we want to protect against an adversary that can corrupt one of the parties and a certain number of the OT candidates, obtaining their inputs and (in the active case) full control of their outputs.

In this work we consider perfectly (unconditionally, zero-error) secure OT-combiners and we focus on \emph{minimizing the number of calls} to the candidate OTs.

First, we construct a single-use (one call per OT candidate) OT-combiner which is perfectly secure against active adversaries corrupting one party and a constant fraction of the OT candidates. This extends a previous result by Ishai et al. (ISIT 2014) that proves the same fact for passive adversaries.

Second, we consider a more general asymmetric corruption model where an adversary can corrupt different sets of OT candidates depending on whether it is Alice or Bob who is corrupted. We give sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of an OT combiner with a given number of calls to the candidate OTs in terms of the existence of secret sharing schemes with certain access structures and share-lengths. This allows in some cases to determine the optimal number of calls to the OT candidates which are needed to construct an OT combiner secure against a given adversary.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / oblivious transfer, combiners, secret sharing

Original Publication (in the same form): IACR-TCC-2017

Date: received 6 Jun 2017, last revised 12 Oct 2017

Contact author: ignacio at math aau dk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Some of the techniques in this paper are based upon those developed by the same authors in report 2014/809; however, the statement of the problem is essentially different and most of the results are new.

Version: 20171012:142344 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/545

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