Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/525

Kurosawa-Desmedt Meets Tight Security

Romain Gay and Dennis Hofheinz and Lisa Kohl

Abstract: At EUROCRYPT 2016, Gay et al. presented the first pairing-free public-key encryption (PKE) scheme with a tight security reduction to a standard assumption. Their scheme is competitive in efficiency with state-of-the art PKE schemes and has very compact ciphertexts (of three group elements), but suffers from a large public key (of about 200 group elements).

In this work, we present an improved pairing-free PKE scheme with a tight security reduction to the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, small ciphertexts (of three group elements), and small public keys (of six group elements). Compared to the work of Gay et al., our scheme thus has a considerably smaller public key and comparable other characteristics, although our encryption and decryption algorithms are somewhat less efficient.

Technically, our scheme borrows ideas both from the work of Gay et al. and from a recent work of Hofheinz (EUROCRYPT, 2017). The core technical novelty of our work is an efficient and compact designated-verifier proof system for an OR-like language. We show that adding such an OR-proof to the ciphertext of the state-of-the-art PKE scheme from Kurosawa and Desmedt enables a tight security reduction.

Category / Keywords: public key encryption, tight security

Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-CRYPTO-2017

Date: received 4 Jun 2017, last revised 24 Oct 2017

Contact author: Romain Gay at ens fr, Dennis Hofheinz@kit edu, Lisa Kohl@kit edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Corrected flaw in the three-way OR-proof construction. Corrected flaw in the OR-proof construction for k>1 (resulting in an efficiency decrease for k>1). Fixed typos and inconsistencies. Improved presentation.

Version: 20171024:153251 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/525

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]