Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/492

Reducing Communication Channels in MPC

Marcel Keller and Dragos Rotaru and Nigel P. Smart and Tim Wood

Abstract: In both information-theoretic and computationally-secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols the parties are usually assumed to be connected by a complete network of secure or authenticated channels, respectively. Taking inspiration from a recent, highly efficient, three-party honest-majority computationally-secure MPC protocol of Araki et al., we show how to perform the most costly part of a computationally secure MPC protocol for an arbitrary $Q_2$ access structure over an incomplete network. We present both passive and actively secure (with abort) variants of our protocol. In all cases we require fewer communication channels for secure multiplication than Maurer's ``MPC-Made-Simple'' protocol, at the expense of requiring pre-shared secret keys for Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs).

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols /

Original Publication (with major differences): SCN 2018

Date: received 31 May 2017, last revised 21 Jun 2018

Contact author: Dragos Rotaru at esat kuleuven be,nigel smart@kuleuven be,M Keller@bristol ac uk,t wood@bristol ac uk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Corrected some bugs

Version: 20180622:054632 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/492


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