Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/467

Access Control Encryption for General Policies from Standard Assumptions

Sam Kim and David J. Wu

Abstract: Functional encryption enables fine-grained access to encrypted data. In many scenarios, however, it is important to control not only what users are allowed to read (as provided by traditional functional encryption), but also what users are allowed to send. Recently, Damgård et al. (TCC 2016) introduced a new cryptographic framework called access control encryption (ACE) for restricting information flow within a system in terms of both what users can read as well as what users can write. While a number of access control encryption schemes exist, they either rely on strong assumptions such as indistinguishability obfuscation or are restricted to simple families of access control policies.

In this work, we give the first ACE scheme for arbitrary policies from standard assumptions. Our construction is generic and can be built from the combination of a digital signature scheme, a predicate encryption scheme, and a (single-key) functional encryption scheme that supports randomized functionalities. All of these primitives can be instantiated from standard assumptions in the plain model and therefore, we obtain the first ACE scheme capable of supporting general policies from standard assumptions. One possible instantiation of our construction relies upon standard number-theoretic assumptions (namely, the DDH and RSA assumptions) and standard lattice assumptions (namely, LWE). Finally, we conclude by introducing several extensions to the ACE framework to support dynamic and more fine-grained access control policies.

Category / Keywords: access control encryption, functional encryption, information flow control

Original Publication (with minor differences): IACR-ASIACRYPT-2017

Date: received 25 May 2017, last revised 5 Sep 2017

Contact author: skim13 at cs stanford edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20170906:000531 (All versions of this report)

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