Paper 2017/446

Secretly Embedding Trapdoors into Contract Signing Protocols

Diana Maimut and George Teseleanu

Abstract

Contract signing protocols have been proposed and analyzed for more than three decades now. One of the main problems that appeared while studying such schemes is the impossibility of achieving both fairness and guaranteed output delivery. As workarounds, cryptographers have put forth three main categories of contract signing schemes: gradual release, optimistic and concurrent or legally fair schemes. Concurrent signature schemes or legally fair protocols do not rely on trusted arbitrators and, thus, may seem more attractive for users. Boosting user trust in such manner, an attacker may cleverly come up with specific applications. Thus, our work focuses on embedding trapdoors into contract signing protocols. In particular, we describe and analyze various SETUP (Secretly Embedded Trapdoor with Universal Protection) mechanisms which can be injected in concurrent signature schemes and legally fair protocols without keystones.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision.SECITC 2017
Keywords
protocolsignatureattackcontractSETUP
Contact author(s)
maimut diana @ gmail com
george teseleanu @ yahoo com
History
2022-03-15: last of 3 revisions
2017-05-23: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/446
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/446,
      author = {Diana Maimut and George Teseleanu},
      title = {Secretly Embedding Trapdoors into Contract Signing Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/446},
      year = {2017},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/446}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/446}
}
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