Paper 2017/431
Understanding RUP Integrity of COLM
Nilanjan Datta, Atul Luykx, Bart Mennink, and Mridul Nandi
Abstract
The authenticated encryption scheme COLM is a third-round candidate in the CAESAR competition. Much like its antecedents COPA, ELmE, and ELmD, COLM consists of two parallelizable encryption layers connected by a linear mixing function. While COPA uses plain XOR mixing, ELmE, ELmD, and COLM use a more involved invertible mixing function. In this work, we investigate the integrity of the COLM structure when unverified plaintext is released, and demonstrate that its security highly depends on the choice of mixing function. Our results are threefold. First, we discuss the practical nonce-respecting forgery by Andreeva et al. (ASIACRYPT 2014) against COPA's XOR mixing. Then we present a nonce-misusing forgery against arbitrary mixing functions with practical time complexity. Finally, by using significantly larger queries, we can extend the previous forgery to be nonce-respecting.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in TOSC 2017 ISSUE 2
- Keywords
- IntegrityRelease of unverified plaintextCOLMCOPAELmDELmE
- Contact author(s)
-
nilanjan_isi_jrf @ yahoo com
atul luykx @ esat kuleuven be
b mennink @ cs ru nl
mridul nandi @ gmail com - History
- 2017-05-22: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/431
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/431,
author = {Nilanjan Datta and Atul Luykx and Bart Mennink and Mridul Nandi},
title = {Understanding {RUP} Integrity of {COLM}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/431},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/431}
}
