To do this, we construct an LWE based multi-key FHE scheme with a very simple one-round distributed setup procedure (vs. the trusted setup required in previous LWE based constructions). This lets us construct the first 3-round semi-malicious MPC protocol without setup from standard LWE using the approach of Mukherjee and Wichs (EUROCRYPT '16). Finally, subexponential hardness and adaptive commitments are used to ''compile'' the protocol into the fully malicious setting.
Category / Keywords: foundations / LWE, Multikey FHE, MPC, Round efficiency Date: received 2 May 2017, last revised 10 Mar 2018 Contact author: antigonipoly at gmail com Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Note: The instantiation of the adaptive commitment is no longer based on the scheme of Pandey, Pass, and Vaikuntanathan (CRYPTO'08) albeit under a non-standard assumption. Instead, it is based on the commitment scheme of Lin, Pass and Soni (FOCS'17). Version: 20180310:214559 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2017/386