Paper 2017/379
Fault attack on Supersingular Isogeny Cryptosystems
Yan Bo Ti
Abstract
We present the first fault attack on cryptosystems based on supersingular isogenies. During the computation of the auxiliary points, the attack aims to change the base point to a random point on the curve via a fault injection. We will show that this would reveal the secret isogeny with one successful perturbation with high probability. We will exhibit the attack by placing it against signature schemes and key-exchange protocols with validations in place. Our paper therefore demonstrates the need to incorporate checks in implementations of the cryptosystem.
Note: Made a minor correction in the introduction.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. PQCrypto 2017
- Keywords
- supersingularisogenyfault attacks
- Contact author(s)
- yanbo ti @ gmail com
- History
- 2017-05-08: revised
- 2017-05-01: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/379
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/379,
author = {Yan Bo Ti},
title = {Fault attack on Supersingular Isogeny Cryptosystems},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/379},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/379}
}
