Paper 2017/290

Double DIP: Re-Evaluating Security of Logic Encryption Algorithms

Yuanqi Shen and Hai Zhou

Abstract

Logic encryption is a hardware security technique that uses extra key inputs to lock a given combinational circuit. A recent study by Subramanyan et al. shows that all existing logic encryption techniques can be successfully attacked. As a countermeasure, SARLock was proposed to enhance the security of existing logic encryptions. In this paper, we re- evaluate the security of these approaches. A SAT-based at- tack called Double DIP is proposed and shown to success- fully defeat SARLock-enhanced encryptions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Proceedings of Great Lake Symposium of VLSI, 2017
DOI
10.1145/3060403.3060469
Keywords
logic encryptioncircuit obfuscation
Contact author(s)
haizhou @ northwestern edu
History
2017-04-03: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/290
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/290,
      author = {Yuanqi Shen and Hai Zhou},
      title = {Double DIP: Re-Evaluating Security of Logic Encryption Algorithms},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/290},
      year = {2017},
      doi = {10.1145/3060403.3060469},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/290}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/290}
}
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