Paper 2017/269
Extending Glitch-Free Multiparty Protocols to Resist Fault Injection Attacks
Okan Seker, Thomas Eisenbarth, and Rainer Steinwandt
Abstract
Side channel analysis and fault attacks are two powerful methods to analyze and break cryptographic implementations. Recently, secure multiparty computation has been applied to prevent side channel attacks. While multiparty computation is known to be fault resistant as well, the particular schemes popular for side channel protection do not currently offer this feature. In this paper we introduce a new secure multiparty circuit to prevent both fault attacks and side channel analysis. The new scheme builds on an existing side channel countermeasure and extends it to preserve errors and propagate them until the end of the circuit. A new recombination operation ensures randomization of the output in the case of an error, ensuring that nothing can be learned from the faulty output. After introducing the new secure multiparty circuit, we show how it can be applied to AES and present the performance and security analysis.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- secret sharingAESfault attacksside channelsmultiparty computation
- Contact author(s)
- teisenbarth @ wpi edu
- History
- 2017-03-25: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/269
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/269,
author = {Okan Seker and Thomas Eisenbarth and Rainer Steinwandt},
title = {Extending Glitch-Free Multiparty Protocols to Resist Fault Injection Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/269},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/269}
}
