Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/185

A Virtual Wiretap Channel for Secure MessageTransmission

Setareh Sharifian, and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, and Fuchun Lin

Abstract: In the Wyner wiretap channel, a sender is connected to a receiver and an eavesdropper through two noisy channels. It has been shown that if the noise in the eavesdropper channel is higher than the receiver's channel, information theoretically secure communication from Alice to Bob, without requiring a shared key, is possible. The approach is particularly attractive noting the rise of quantum computers and possibility of the complete collapse of today's’ cryptographic infrastructure. If the eavesdropper’s channel is noise free, however, no secrecy can be obtained. The iJam protocol, proposed by Gollakota and Katabi, is an interactive protocol over noise free channels that uses friendly jamming the receiver to establish an information theoretically secure shared key between the sender and the receiver. The protocol relies on the Basic iJam Transmission Protocol (BiT protocol) that uses properties of OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing) to create uncertainty for Eve (hence noisy view) in receiving the sent information, and use this uncertainty to construct a secure key agreement protocol. The protocol has been implemented and evaluated using extensive experiments that examine the best eavesdropper’s reception strategy. In this paper, we develop an abstract model for BiT protocol as a wiretap channel and refer to it as a virtual wiretap channel. We estimate parameters of this virtual wiretap channel, derive the secrecy capacity of this channel and design a secure message transmission protocol with provable semantic security using the channel. Our analysis and protocol give a physical layer security protocol, with provable security, that is implementable in practice (BiT protocol has already been implemented).

Category / Keywords: information theoretic security, wiretap channel, wireless security, invertible extractors

Original Publication (in the same form): Springer, LNCS series

Date: received 23 Feb 2017

Contact author: ssharifi at ucalgary ca

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20170228:175743 (All versions of this report)

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