Paper 2017/166

A roadmap to fully homomorphic elections: Stronger security, better verifiability

Kristian Gjøsteen and Martin Strand

Abstract

After the trials of remote internet voting for local elections in 2011 and parliamentary elections in 2013, a number of local referendums has renewed interest in internet voting in Norway. The voting scheme used in Norway is not quantum-safe and it has limited voter verifiability. In this case study, we consider how we can use fully homomorphic encryption to construct a quantum-safe voting scheme with better voter verifiability. While fully homomorphic cryptosystems are not efficient enough for the the system we sketch to be implemented and run today, we expect future improvements in fully homomorphic encryption which may eventually make these techniques practical.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. 2nd Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting Schemes
Keywords
fully homomorphic encryptionremote internet votingquantum-safe
Contact author(s)
martin strand @ ntnu no
History
2017-02-23: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/166
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/166,
      author = {Kristian Gjøsteen and Martin Strand},
      title = {A roadmap to fully homomorphic elections: Stronger security, better verifiability},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/166},
      year = {2017},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/166}
}
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