Paper 2017/141

Partitioned Group Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange

Dario Fiore, Maria Isabel Gonzalez Vasco, and Claudio Soriente

Abstract

Group Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange (GPAKE) allows a group of users to establish a secret key, as long as all of them share the same password. However, in existing GPAKE protocols as soon as one user runs the protocol with a non-matching password, all the others abort and no key is established. In this paper we seek for a more flexible, yet secure, GPAKE and put forward the notion of partitioned GPAKE. Partitioned GPAKE tolerates users that run the protocol on different passwords. Through a protocol run, any subgroup of users that indeed share a password, establish a session key, factoring out the ``noise'' of inputs by users holding different passwords. At the same time any two keys, each established by a different subgroup of users, are pair-wise independent if the corresponding subgroups hold different passwords. We also introduce the notion of password-privacy for partitioned GPAKE, which is a kind of affiliation hiding property, ensuring that an adversary should not be able to tell whether any given set of users share a password. Finally, we propose an efficient instantiation of partitioned GPAKE building on an unforgeable symmetric encryption scheme and a PAKE by Bellare et al. Our proposal is proven secure in the random oracle/ideal cipher model, and requires only two communication rounds.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
group password authenticated key exchangepassword privacy
Contact author(s)
mariaisabel vasco @ urjc es
History
2017-02-20: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/141
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/141,
      author = {Dario Fiore and Maria Isabel Gonzalez Vasco and Claudio Soriente},
      title = {Partitioned Group Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/141},
      year = {2017},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/141}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/141}
}
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