Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/1259

Cryptanalysis of HK17

Haoyu Li and Renzhang Liu and Yanbin Pan and Tianyuan Xie

Abstract: Very recently, a key exchange scheme called HK17 was submitted to NIST as a candidate of the standard of post-quantum cryptography. The HK17 scheme employs some hypercomplex numbers as the basic objects, such as quaternions and octonions. In this paper, we show that HK17 is insecure since a passive adversary can recover the shared key in polynomial time.

Category / Keywords: Key exchange

Date: received 27 Dec 2017, last revised 30 Dec 2017

Contact author: panyanbin at amss ac cn

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Version: 20171231:020430 (All versions of this report)

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