HILA5 Pindakaas: On the CCA security of lattice-based encryption with error correction

Daniel J.  Bernstein; Leon Groot Bruinderink; Tanja Lange; Lorenz Panny

Paper 2017/1214

HILA5 Pindakaas: On the CCA security of lattice-based encryption with error correction

Daniel J. Bernstein, Leon Groot Bruinderink, Tanja Lange, and Lorenz Panny

Abstract

We show that the NISTPQC submission HILA5 is not secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks. Specifically, we demonstrate a key-recovery attack on HILA5 using an active attack on reused keys. The attack works around the error correction in HILA5. The attack applies to the HILA5 key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM), and also to the public-key encryption mechanism (PKE) obtained by NIST's procedure for combining the KEM with authenticated encryption. This contradicts the most natural interpretation of the IND-CCA security claim for HILA5.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: Post-quantum cryptography KEM RLWE reaction attack.
Contact author(s): authorcontact-helaas @ box cr yp to
History: 2018-03-09: revised; 2017-12-18: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2017/1214
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/1214,
      author = {Daniel J.  Bernstein and Leon Groot Bruinderink and Tanja Lange and Lorenz Panny},
      title = {{HILA5} Pindakaas: On the {CCA} security of lattice-based encryption with error correction},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/1214},
      year = {2017},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1214}
}