Paper 2017/1201

Collusion Resistant Watermarking Schemes for Cryptographic Functionalities

Rupeng Yang, Man Ho Au, Junzuo Lai, Qiuliang Xu, and Zuoxia Yu

Abstract

A cryptographic watermarking scheme embeds a message into a program while preserving its functionality. Recently, a number of watermarking schemes have been proposed, which are proven secure in the sense that given one marked program, any attempt to remove the embedded message will substantially change its functionality. In this paper, we formally initiate the study of collusion attacks for watermarking schemes, where the attacker’s goal is to remove the embedded messages given multiple copies of the same program, each with a different embedded message. This is motivated by practical scenarios, where a program may be marked multiple times with different messages. The results of this work are twofold. First, we examine existing cryptographic watermarking schemes and observe that all of them are vulnerable to collusion attacks. Second, we construct collusion resistant watermarking schemes for various cryptographic functionalities (e.g., pseudorandom function evaluation, decryption, etc.). To achieve our second result, we present a new primitive called puncturable functional encryption scheme, which may be of independent interest.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2019
Keywords
WatermarkingWatermarkable PRFCollusion ResistancePublic Extraction
Contact author(s)
orbbyrp @ gmail com
History
2019-09-11: revised
2017-12-18: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/1201
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/1201,
      author = {Rupeng Yang and Man Ho Au and Junzuo Lai and Qiuliang Xu and Zuoxia Yu},
      title = {Collusion Resistant Watermarking Schemes for Cryptographic Functionalities},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/1201},
      year = {2017},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1201}
}
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