Paper 2017/1200
MixColumns Properties and Attacks on (round-reduced) AES with a Single Secret S-Box
Lorenzo Grassi
Abstract
In this paper, we present new key-recovery attacks on AES with a single secret S-Box. Several attacks for this model have been proposed in literature, the most recent ones at Crypto’16 and FSE’17. Both these attacks exploit a particular property of the MixColumns matrix to recover the secret-key. In this work, we show that the same attacks work exploiting a weaker property of the MixColumns matrix. As first result, this allows to (largely) increase the number of MixColumns matrices for which it is possible to set up all these attacks. As a second result, we present new attacks on 5-round AES with a single secret S-Box that exploit the new multiple-of-n property recently proposed at Eurocrypt’17. This property is based on the fact that choosing a particular set of plaintexts, the number of pairs of ciphertexts that lie in a particular subspace is a multiple of n.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. CT-RSA 2018
- Keywords
- AESMixColumnskey-recovery attacksecret S-Box
- Contact author(s)
- lorenzo grassi @ iaik tugraz at
- History
- 2018-01-08: revised
- 2017-12-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/1200
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/1200,
author = {Lorenzo Grassi},
title = {{MixColumns} Properties and Attacks on (round-reduced) {AES} with a Single Secret S-Box},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/1200},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1200}
}
