Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/1173

Fully Verifiable Secure Delegation of Pairing Computation: Cryptanalysis and An Efficient Construction

Osmanbey Uzunkol and Öznur Kalkar and İsa Sertkaya

Abstract: We address the problem of secure and verifiable delegation of general pairing computation. We first analyze some recently proposed pairing delegation schemes and present several attacks on their security and/or verifiability properties. In particular, we show that none of these achieve the claimed security and verifiability properties simultaneously. We then provide a fully verifiable secure delegation scheme ${\sf VerPair}$ under one-malicious version of a two-untrusted-program model (OMTUP). ${\sf VerPair}$ not only significantly improves the efficiency of all the previous schemes, such as fully verifiable schemes of Chevallier-Mames et al. and Canard et al. by eliminating the impractical exponentiation- and scalar-multiplication-consuming steps, but also offers for the first time the desired full verifiability property unlike other practical schemes. Furthermore, we give a more efficient and less memory consuming invocation of the subroutine ${\sf Rand}$ for ${\sf VerPair}$ by eliminating the requirement of offline computations of modular exponentiations and scalar-multiplications. In particular, ${\sf Rand}$ includes a fully verifiable partial delegation under the OMTUP assumption. The partial delegation of ${\sf Rand}$ distinguishes ${\sf VerPair}$ as a useful lightweight delegation scheme when the delegator is resource-constrained (e.g. RFID tags, smart cards or sensor nodes).

Category / Keywords: Verifiable and secure delegation, bilinear maps, cryptographic protocols, cloud security, lightweight cryptography

Date: received 1 Dec 2017, last revised 6 Dec 2017

Contact author: osmanbey uzunkol at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20171206:090009 (All versions of this report)

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