Paper 2017/1171
Attacks on the AJPS Mersenne-based cryptosystem
Koen de Boer, Léo Ducas, Stacey Jeffery, and Ronald de Wolf
Abstract
Aggarwal, Joux, Prakash and Santha recently introduced a new potentially quantum-safe public-key cryptosystem, and suggested that a brute-force attack is essentially optimal against it. They consider but then dismiss both Meet-in-the-Middle attacks and LLL-based attacks. Very soon after their paper appeared, Beunardeau et al.\ proposed a practical LLL-based technique that seemed to significantly reduce the security of the AJPS system. In this paper we do two things. First, we show that a Meet-in-the-Middle attack can also be made to work against the AJPS system, using locality-sensitive hashing to overcome the difficulty that Aggarwal et al.\ saw for such attacks. We also present a quantum version of this attack. Second, we give a more precise analysis of the attack of Beunardeau et al., confirming and refining their results.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. PQCrypto 2018
- Keywords
- CryptanalysisMersenneNTRUMeet-in-the-MiddleLattice
- Contact author(s)
- kboer @ cwi nl
- History
- 2018-01-25: revised
- 2017-12-06: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/1171
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/1171,
author = {Koen de Boer and Léo Ducas and Stacey Jeffery and Ronald de Wolf},
title = {Attacks on the {AJPS} Mersenne-based cryptosystem},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/1171},
year = {2017},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1171}
}
