Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/1147

Under Pressure: Security of Caesar Candidates beyond their Guarantees

Serge Vaudenay and Damian Vizár

Abstract: The Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability and Robustness (CAESAR) has as its official goal to ``identify a portfolio of authenticated ciphers that offer advantages over AES-GCM and are suitable for widespread adoption.'' Each of the 15 candidate schemes competing in the currently ongoing 3rd round of CAESAR must clearly declare its security claims, i.a. whether or not it can tolerate nonce misuse, and what is the maximal data complexity for which security is guaranteed. These claims appear to be valid for all 15 candidates. Interpreting "Robustness" in CAESAR as the ability to mitigate damage even if security guarantees are void, we describe attacks with birthday complexity or beyond, and/or with nonce reuse for each of the 15 candidates. We then sort the candidates into classes depending on how powerful does an attacker need to be to mount (semi-)universal forgeries, decryption attacks, or key recoveries. Rather than invalidating the security claims of any of the candidates, our results provide an additional criterion for evaluating the security that candidates deliver, which can be useful for e.g. breaking ties in the final CAESAR discussions.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Authenticated Encryption, CAESAR Competition, Forgery, Decryption Attack, Birthday Bound, Nonce Misuse

Date: received 27 Nov 2017, last revised 7 Dec 2017

Contact author: damian vizar at epfl ch

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20171207:080822 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/1147

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