Paper 2017/1126

Privacy Games for Syntactic Privacy Notions

Robin Ankele and Andrew Simpson

Abstract

It is well understood that the huge volumes of data captured in recent years have the potential to underpin significant research developments in many fields. But, to realise these benefits, all relevant parties must be comfortable with how this data is shared. At the heart of this is the notion of privacy --- which is recognised as being somewhat difficult to define. Previous authors have shown how privacy notions such as anonymity, unlinkability and pseudonymity might be combined into a single formal framework. In this paper we use and extend this work by defining privacy games for individual and group privacy within distributed environments. More precisely, for each privacy notion, we formulate a game that an adversary has to win in order to break the notion. Via these games, we aim to clarify understanding of, and relationships between, different privacy notions; we also aim to give an unambiguous understanding of adversarial actions. Additionally, we extend previous work via the notion of unobservability.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
privacyprivacy gamesprivacy notionsunobservability
Contact author(s)
robin ankele @ cs ox ac uk
History
2018-01-15: revised
2017-11-24: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/1126
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/1126,
      author = {Robin Ankele and Andrew Simpson},
      title = {Privacy Games for Syntactic Privacy Notions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/1126},
      year = {2017},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1126}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1126}
}
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