Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/1126

Privacy Games for Syntactic Privacy Notions

Robin Ankele and Andrew Simpson

Abstract: It is well understood that the huge volumes of data captured in recent years have the potential to underpin significant research developments in many fields. But, to realise these benefits, all relevant parties must be comfortable with how this data is shared. At the heart of this is the notion of privacy --- which is recognised as being somewhat difficult to define. Previous authors have shown how privacy notions such as anonymity, unlinkability and pseudonymity might be combined into a single formal framework. In this paper we use and extend this work by defining privacy games for individual and group privacy within distributed environments. More precisely, for each privacy notion, we formulate a game that an adversary has to win in order to break the notion. Via these games, we aim to clarify understanding of, and relationships between, different privacy notions; we also aim to give an unambiguous understanding of adversarial actions. Additionally, we extend previous work via the notion of unobservability.

Category / Keywords: foundations / privacy, privacy games, privacy notions, unobservability

Date: received 21 Nov 2017, last revised 15 Jan 2018

Contact author: robin ankele at cs ox ac uk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180115:151522 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/1126

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