Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/1082

Instruction Duplication: Leaky and Not Too Fault-Tolerant!

Lucian Cojocar and Kostas Papagiannopoulos and Niek Timmers

Abstract: Fault injection attacks alter the intended behavior of micro- controllers, compromising their security. These attacks can be mitigated using software countermeasures. A widely-used software-based solution to deflect fault attacks is instruction duplication and n-plication. We explore two main limitations with these approaches: first, we examine the effect of instruction duplication under fault attacks, demonstrating that as fault tolerance mechanism, code duplication does not provide a strong protection in practice. Second, we show that instruction duplication increases side-channel leakage of sensitive code regions using a multivariate exploitation technique both in theory and in practice.

Category / Keywords: implementation / side channel analysis, fault injection, duplication, infection

Original Publication (with minor differences): CARDIS 2017

Date: received 7 Nov 2017

Contact author: kostaspap88 at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20171110:155211 (All versions of this report)

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