Paper 2017/1066
Bulletproofs: Short Proofs for Confidential Transactions and More
Benedikt Bünz, Jonathan Bootle, Dan Boneh, Andrew Poelstra, Pieter Wuille, and Greg Maxwell
Abstract
We propose Bulletproofs, a new non-interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol
with very short proofs and without a trusted setup; the proof size is only logarithmic in the witness size.
Bulletproofs are especially well suited for efficient range proofs on committed values: they enable proving that a committed value is in a range using only
Note: This version fixes an earlier mistake in the Fiat-Shamir section (Section 4.4) reported by TrailOfBits.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. 39th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2018
- Contact author(s)
- buenz @ cs stanford edu
- History
- 2022-04-14: last of 14 revisions
- 2017-11-10: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2017/1066
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/1066, author = {Benedikt Bünz and Jonathan Bootle and Dan Boneh and Andrew Poelstra and Pieter Wuille and Greg Maxwell}, title = {Bulletproofs: Short Proofs for Confidential Transactions and More}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/1066}, year = {2017}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1066} }