Paper 2017/1054

On the security of another CRC based ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol

Seyed Farhad Aghili and Hamid Mala

Abstract

Design of ultra-lightweight authentication protocols for RFID systems conformed with the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard is still a challenging issue in RFID security. Recently, Maurya et al. have proposed a CRC based authentication protocol and claimed that their protocol can resist against all known attacks in RFID systems. However, in this paper we show that their protocol is vulnerable to tag impersonation attack. Moreover, we show that how an attacker can easily trace a target RFID tag. Our analyses show that the success probability of our attacks is “1” while the complexity is only one session eavesdropping, two XORs and one CRC computation.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s)
aghili farhad60 @ gmail com
History
2017-10-31: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/1054
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/1054,
      author = {Seyed Farhad Aghili and Hamid Mala},
      title = {On the security of another {CRC} based ultralightweight {RFID} authentication protocol},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2017/1054},
      year = {2017},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1054}
}
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