Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/1000

No right to remain silent: Isolating Malicious Mixes

Hemi Leibowitz and Ania Piotrowska and George Danezis and Amir Herzberg

Abstract: Mix networks are a key technology to achieve network anonymity and private messaging, voting and database lookups. However, simple mix network designs are vulnerable to malicious mixes, which may drop or delay packets to facilitate traffic analysis attacks. Mix networks with provable robustness address this drawback through complex and expensive proofs of correct shuffling but come at a great cost and make limiting or unrealistic systems assumptions. We present Miranda, an efficient mix-net design, which mitigates active attacks by malicious mixes. Miranda uses both the detection of corrupt mixes, as well as detection of faults related to a pair of mixes, without detection of the faulty one among the two. Each active attack - including dropping packets - leads to reduced connectivity for corrupt mixes and reduces their ability to attack, and, eventually, to detection of corrupt mixes. We show, through experiments, the effectiveness of Miranda, by demonstrating how malicious mixes are detected and that attacks are neutralized early.

Category / Keywords: Anonymity, mix networks, byzantine attacks

Original Publication (with minor differences): To appear in Usenix security 2019

Date: received 9 Oct 2017, last revised 13 Aug 2019

Contact author: leibo hemi at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: This version also contains appendixes.

Version: 20190814:050350 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2017/1000


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