Paper 2017/095

Attacks on Secure Logging Schemes

Gunnar Hartung

Abstract

We present four attacks on three cryptographic schemes intended for securing log files against illicit retroactive modification. Our first two attacks regard the LogFAS scheme by Yavuz et al. (Financial Cryptography 2012), whereas our third and fourth attacks break the BM- and AR-FssAgg schemes by Ma (AsiaCCS 2008). All schemes have an accompanying security proof, seemingly contradicting the existence of attacks. We point out flaws in these proofs, resolving the contradiction.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Financial Cryptography 2017
Keywords
Log FilesLogFASFssAggDigital SignaturesForward SecurityAttackCryptanalysis
Contact author(s)
gunnar hartung @ kit edu
History
2017-02-13: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/095
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/095,
      author = {Gunnar Hartung},
      title = {Attacks on Secure Logging Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/095},
      year = {2017},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/095}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/095}
}
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