Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/081
Estonian Voting Verification Mechanism Revisited Again
Ivo Kubjas and Tiit Pikma and Jan Willemson
Abstract: Recently, Mus, Kiraz, Cenk and Sertkaya proposed an improvement over the present Estonian Internet voting vote verification. This paper points to the weaknesses and questionable design choices of the new scheme. We show that the scheme does not fix the vote privacy issue it claims to. It also introduces a way for a malicious voting application to manipulate the vote without being detected by the verification mechanism, hence breaking the cast-as-intended property. As a solution, we propose modifying the protocol of Mus et al. slightly and argue for improvement of the security guarantees. However, there is inherent drop in usability in the protocol as proposed by Mus et al., and this issue will also remain in our improved protocol.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Electronic voting, vote verification
Original Publication (in the same form): Accepted to E-Vote-ID 2017
Date: received 2 Feb 2017, last revised 26 Jul 2017
Contact author: jan willemson at gmail com
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: An improved version of the proposed verification protocol.
Version: 20170726:152420 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2017/081
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