A First DFA on PRIDE: from Theory to Practice (extended version)

Benjamin Lac, Marc Beunardeau, Anne Canteaut, Jacques Fournier, and Renaud Sirdey

Abstract

PRIDE is one of the most effcient lightweight block cipher proposed so far for connected objects with high performance and low resource constraints. In this paper we describe the first ever complete Differential Fault Analysis against PRIDE. We describe how fault attacks can be used against implementations of PRIDE to recover the entire encryption key. Our attack has been validated first through simulations, and then in practice on a software implementation of PRIDE running on a device that could typically be used in IoT devices. Faults have been injected using electromagnetic pulses during the PRIDE execution and the faulty ciphertexts have been used to recover the key bits. We also discuss some countermeasures that could be used to thwart such attacks.

Available format(s)
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MINOR revision.To appear in the Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Risks and Security of Internet and Systems
Keywords
cryptanalysis
Contact author(s)
renaud sirdey @ gmail com
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/075

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/075,
author = {Benjamin Lac and Marc Beunardeau and Anne Canteaut and Jacques Fournier and Renaud Sirdey},
title = {A First DFA on PRIDE: from Theory to Practice (extended version)},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/075},
year = {2017},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/075}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/075}
}

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