Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/993

Comparing Sboxes of Ciphers from the Perspective of Side-Channel Attacks

Liran Lerman and Olivier Markowitch and Nikita Veshchikov

Abstract: Side-channel attacks exploit physical characteristics of implementations of cryptographic algorithms in order to extract sensitive information such as the secret key. These physical attacks are among the most powerful attacks against real-world cryptosystems. This paper analyses the non-linear part (called Sboxes) of ciphers, which is often targeted by implementation attacks. We analyse Sboxes of several candidates that were sub- mitted to the competition on authenticated encryption (CAESAR) as well as several other ciphers. We compare theoretical metrics with results from simulations and with real experiments. In this paper, we demonstrate that, in some contexts, the theoretical metrics provide no information on the resiliency of the Sboxes against side-channel attacks.

Category / Keywords: implementation / boolean functions, Sbox, side-channel attacks, simulation

Original Publication (in the same form): Asian HOST 2016

Date: received 14 Oct 2016

Contact author: nikita veshchikov at ulb ac be

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20161017:193426 (All versions of this report)

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