Paper 2016/901

Distance Bounding based on PUF

Mathilde Igier and Serge Vaudenay

Abstract

Distance Bounding (DB) is designed to mitigate relay attacks. This paper provides a complete study of the DB protocol of Kleber et al. based on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). We contradict the claim that it resists to Terrorist Fraud (TF). We propose some slight modifications to increase the security of the protocol and formally prove TF-resistance, as well as resistance to Distance Fraud (DF), and Man-In-the-Middle attacks (MiM) which include relay attacks.

Note: This version is the full version. It includes proofs, figures, tables, best found attacks, and treatments on impersonation attacks and distance hijacking.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. CANS 2016 (LNCS vol. 10052)
Keywords
distance bounding
Contact author(s)
serge vaudenay @ epfl ch
matyldeigier @ gmail com
History
2016-10-18: last of 2 revisions
2016-09-15: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/901
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/901,
      author = {Mathilde Igier and Serge Vaudenay},
      title = {Distance Bounding based on PUF},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/901},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/901}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/901}
}
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